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The purpose of this paper is to provide a background perspective for the applied papers at 
the conference. This perspective differs from that of neoclassical theory and is rooted in 
detailed micro studies by such students of technological change as Nathan Rosenberg and 
Christopher Freeman, as well as the theoretical structures based on evolutionary rather 
than equilibrium modeling. My colleagues and I call our own version of this branch of 
economics “structuralist-evolutionary”.
2 
Part I  gives some background material on technology and technological change. Part II 
introduces the structuralist-evolutionary model and contrasts it with the neoclassical 
model of economic growth. Part III introduces the concept of a general purpose 
technology. Part IV discusses the current revolution in information and communications 
technology (ICTs) of which the internet is part. It concludes with a discussion of two 
important questions: “Is there  a real ICT revolution or just a modest set of undramatic 
changes?” and what does total factor productivity actually measure?” Here I argue that 
TFP does not measure technological change and that its common use to evaluate the 
importance of the ICT revolution is misguided. Part V concludes with a few policy 
implications.  
I. THE TECHNOLOGICAL BACKGROUND 
A. Long-Term Growth Driven by Technological Change 
Although technology is distrusted by many observers, humans are fundamentally 
technological animals. Indeed, technology is as old as the first hominid creatures, taking 
early forms in weapons, tools, clothing, methods of preparing food and the control of fire. 
Modern archaeological research suggests that, from the very outset of human evolution, 
technology has played a critical role. 
                                                 
1 Virtually all of the original ideas expounded here are contained in a series of articles written over the past 
decade, many of which were co-authored with either or both Clifford Bekar and Kenneth Carlaw. My debt 
to both of these researchers, who were originally my graduate research students and research assistants, but 
are now university professors, will be obvious from the references throughout. I am also indebted to the 
conference participants for many helpful comments and criticisms.  
2 The original inspiration for our model was the concept of a techno-economic paradigm as expounded in 
Freeman and Perez (1988). Our reasons for not continuing to use their very insightful way of looking at 
major technological changes are given in Lipsey and Bekar (1995).    
Technology is probably the most significant element in determining 
what we are today, not just in forming modern “civilization,” but in 
directing the course of our evolution from a distant apelike 
ancestor....Genetically, anatomically, behaviorally, and socially, we 
have been shaped through natural selection into tool makers and tool 
users. This is the net result of more than .5 million years of 
evolutionary forces working on our biology and behavior…[which 
produced] human beings as profoundly technological creatures. 
(Schick and Toth 1993, 17–18.)  
Technology helped to turn us from apes into humans and then altered our behavior from 
animal-like hunting and gathering to members of complex and sophisticated 
civilizations.
3  
Long-term growth is driven by technological changethat is, by changes in the goods 
and services that we produce and in the way that we produce them. These changes imply 
that most calculations of the growth in real incomes are radical understatements of the 
full impact of economic growth on the average person.   
Although we have five times as much market value of consumption as 
did our Victorian ancestors, we consume it largely in terms of new 
commodities made with new techniques that were unknown to the 
Victorians. They could not have imagined modern dental and medical 
equipment, penicillin, painkillers, bypass operations, safe births, 
personal computers, compact discs, television sets, automobiles, 
opportunities for cheap, fast, worldwide travel, affordable 
universities, safe food of great variety, or central heating, much less 
the elimination of endless kitchen drudgery through the use of 
detergents, washing machines, electric stoves, vacuum cleaners, and a 
host of other new household products that their great grandchildren 
take for granted. (Lipsey 1996:6) 
Nor could they have imagined today’s clean, quiet, computer-assisted factory, largely run 
by robots and a host of other radically new methods of producing our goods and services 
and organizing our productive activities. The point is important. Technological advance 
not only raises our incomes; it transforms our lives by creating new, hitherto undreamed 
of things (new product technologies) and allowing us to make them in new, hitherto 
                                                 
3 Presented with a problem, our technological nature makes us inclined to innovate our way out of it. So my 
co-authors and I take technological change as the rule in any society where conditions are changing. Thus, 
the historical problem is to explain why in some places and at some times technologies stagnated rather 
than to explain why in other places and at other times technological change was the rule (albeit at a pace 
that is slow by today’s standards).  
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undreamed of ways (new process technologies).
4 In the long term, new technologies 
transform peoples' standards of living, their economic, social, and political ways of life, 
and even their value systems. 
B. Growth Accumulation and Technological Change  
Economic historians and students of technology agree that technological change is the 
major determinant of long-term, global economic growth.
5 However, virtually all new 
process technologies are embodied in new capital equipment, while virtually all new 
goods require new (or modified) capital goods to produce them. So investment and the 
savings that finance it are complementary with technological change. Anything that slows 
the rate of embodiment of new technologies through investment, such as unnecessarily 
high interest rates, will slow the rate of growth, just as any slowdown in the development 
of new technology will do so in the long term. 
Surprisingly perhaps, growth is affected more in the short term by variations in 
investment then by variations in the rate of technological change. This is because there is 
always a large pool of existing technologies have not been fully exploited. Variations in 
the rate of investment cause variations in the rate of exploitation of these technologies. 
Nonetheless, as the argument in footnote 5 suggests, in the very long run it is 
technological change that has most influence on living standardsalthough the strong 
short run relation between growth and investment has erroneously led some observers to 
conclude that investment is the major determinate of long term growth and that 
technological change is relatively unimportant.  
                                                 
4 Accepting the overwhelming importance of technological change in determining long-term economic 
growth does not imply economic determinism that makes technology sufficient to determine all social and 
economic outcomes. The same technology introduced into different social and economic structures 
typically produces very different results (which would not be the case if technology determined 
everything). The vastly different effects of TV on political processes in the US and the UK is one dramatic 
case in point.  
5 A simple thought experiment should make this point. Imagine freezing technological knowledge at the 
levels existing in, say, 1900, while continuing to accumulate more 1900-vintage machines and factories and 
using them to produce more 1900-vintage goods and services and while training more people longer and 
more thoroughly in the technological knowledge that was available in 1900. It is obvious that today we 
would have vastly lower living standards than we now enjoy (and pollution would be a massive problem).  
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C. Empirical Generalizations Concerning Technological Change 
Here are some of the key empirical generalizations that are critical for understanding the 
behavior of technological change and evaluating innovation policies. These have been 
established through decades of research by students of technology.
6 Many are in clear 
contradiction to the assumptions commonly used in neoclassical economics and so 
provide a cautionary lesson concerning the dangers of using neoclassical theory to 
analyze technological change. For many micro-economic problems neoclassical 
comparative static analysis, with its assumptions of constant tastes and technology and 
stable equilibria, is extremely useful. But that theory is not well adapted to the study of 
micro-economic behavior in which technology is changing endogenously at a rate 
sufficiently fast to affect the outcome of the analysis. Other theories are needed to study 
such behavior.   
1. Endogenous R&D  
Because R&D is an expensive activity that is often undertaken by firms in search of 
profit, innovation is to a great extent endogenous to the economic system, altering in 
response to changes in perceived profit opportunities. Furthermore, pure science 
undertaken in such places as government and university laboratories is also largely 
endogenous. The reasons for this are more subtle than for the case of commercially 
directed R&D. (See Rosenberg, 1982, Chapter 7.) In the past, technological change has 
often led pure science by presenting it with the problem of understanding why certain 
practical technologies worked. Beginning in the later 19
th century, however, science has 
more and more to lead technology in many areas (but by no means everywhere).  
In contrast to the emphasis on short run price-quantity and long run capacity decisions 
found in most theoretical treatments of firms and industries, endogenous innovation is a 
major strategic variable for firms competing in manufacturing and service production.
 7 
Constant successful innovation is needed just to maintain one's market share. Ceteris 
paribus, a market served by a few competing oligopolists usually produces more 
                                                 
6 Every one of these generalizations requires a least a chapter if not a book length treatment to do it justice. 
7 To handle this behavior, the Austrian concept of competition as a process is needed, rather than the 
neoclassical concept of competition as an end-state. In process competition: “...firms jostle for advantage 
by price and non-price competition, undercutting and outbidding rivals in the market-place by advertising 
outlays and promotional expenses, launching new differentiated products, new technical processes, new 
methods of marketing and new organizational forms, and even new reward structures for their employees, 
all for the sake of head-start profits that they know will soon be eroded. ...[in short] competition is an active 
process.” (Blaug, 1977: 255-6) 
 
  4    
innovation than either a market served by a monopolist or one served by price-taking 
firms whose revenue just cover their full costs of production. One reason why continual 
innovation is important to firms is that many inventions are not appropriable. Patents are 
easily circumvented except with a few products such as pharmaceuticals, chemicals, and 
the entities created by biotechnology.  
Because technological competition takes place within an existing structureinstitutions, 
methods of organization, and the location and nature of physical and human 
capitalthere is no pure long run in which decisions take place in an environment 
unconstrained by the past decisions of any agent. Hence, neoclassical long run 
equilibrium theory is not only inapplicable, it is often misleading. Because what a firm or 
industry can do today is influenced by its acquired skills and experience, which are partly 
determined by what it did in the past, decisions about future developments are influenced 
by past decisions. For these, and many other reasons, technological change is path 
dependant.  
Salients are one manifestation of path dependency. When a product or process is 
evolving, technical problems tend to be solved one at a time, seldom leaving the overall 
technology perfectly balanced. For instance, the wing of one type of aircraft may be 
currently able to bear more load than the engines can pull. This creates an incentive to 
improve the engines. The improved engines may then be able to do things that the current 
wings cannot support. In this way, technological change often evolves through a series of 
bottlenecks in which the alteration of one creates another.  
2. Evolution of new technologies   
Changes in both product and process technologies occur continuously and cover the 
whole range from incremental improvements in existing technologies to those that are 
revolutionary in conception and effect. A high proportion of all technical change takes 
the form of incremental changes to existing product and process technologies. The source 
of innovative ideas is sometimes found among up-stream suppliers, sometimes among 
producers, and sometimes among downstream users. How the location of these ideas 
differs across different industries can often be explained by the type of firm that can most 
easily appropriate the rents from innovation (von Hipple 1988). 
Major radical innovations never bring new technologies into the world in fully developed 
form. Instead, these technologies typically first appear in a crude embryonic state with 
only a few specific uses. Improvements and diffusion then occur simultaneously as the 
technology is made more efficient and adapted for use over an increasingly wide range of 
applications. As a result, most development expenditure is on product not process 
development. 
The diffusion of knowledge about successful innovations is a slow and costly business. 
Just to discover what is currently in use throughout the world is a daunting task, 
particularly for small firms. At best knowing what is done elsewhere only provides the 
blueprint; making it operational requires acquiring all the tacit knowledge that is required 
to operate any technology successfully. It follows that the existing set of technologies 
does not provide a freely available pool of knowledge available to all existing 
firmsmany economic theories of growth notwithstanding. Instead learning about what 
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is in use elsewhere and adapting it to one's own uses is a slow and costly process that 
typically requires innovation in its own right. (Thus, innovation and diffusion shade into 
each other rather than being fully distinct activities.) 
Major innovations in product technologies, such as the introduction of wholly new 
products, often require only incremental changes in production technologies. Thus, in a 
process that Rosenberg (1976) calls technological convergence, technologies that produce 
such widely separated products as sewing machines, bicycles and automobiles shared 
common production technologies. It follows that cases in which radical innovations occur 
in both products and their production processes are much less common than one would 
think by studying products only. Furthermore, regional competitive advantages that 
persist through successive generations of new and often radically different product 
technologies are often based on process technologies that are common to these products 
(e.g., New England’s long-term competitive advantage in guns, sewing machines, 
machine tools, and many other non-electronic manufactured products).     
3. Technological spillovers  
Innovations are vertically and horizontally linked to other innovations, often occurring in 
a related cluster of changes in several branches of the economy. The total set of these 
innovations produces much more additional value than the value that would be produced 
if each were introduced in isolation. Really major innovations affect the value of capital 
goods and production facilities as well as research programs throughout the economy, 
bringing gains and losses that do not affect the cost or profits of the original innovators. 
The importance of this point is inversely related to the time it takes to make it!
8 
4. Uncertainty  
Because innovation means doing something not done before, there is an element of 
uncertainty (in Frank Knight's sense of the term) in all innovation. It is often impossible 
even to enumerate in advance the possible outcomes of a particular line of research. Time 
and money are often spent investigating specific avenues of research to discover if they 
are blind alleys or full of immensely rich pots of gold. As a result, large sums are 
sometimes spent with no positive results, while trivial expenditures sometimes produce 
results of great value. Furthermore, the search for one objective often produces results of 
value for quite different objectives. All this implies that agents are making choices under 
conditions of uncertainty (in Frank Knight’s sense of the term). They are not be able to 
assign probabilities to different occurrences in order to conduct risk analysis as 
conventionally defined.   
                                                 
8 Technological complementarities, which are what lie behind technological spillovers and which are what 
allow growth based on technological change to persist indefinitely, are a much wider concept than the 
technological externalities that are usually viewed as the measure of technological spillovers. For 
elaboration see Lipsey and Carlaw (2000).  
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Uncertainty is involved in more than just making some initial technological 
breakthrough. There is uncertainty with respect to the range of applications that some 
new technology may have. The steam engine, electricity, the telephone, radio, the laser, 
the computer, the VCR, and fiber optics are examples of technologies that were initially 
thought to have very limited potential, and that did have very limited actual applications 
during the first decades of their lives. One other interesting case in point is that the 
internet was initially expected to be of most use in communications between producers 
and customers whereas communications among producers evolved to be more important.  
Large technological leaps require more changes in the products, processes and supporting 
structures and hence, involve a greater exposure to uncertainty than do attempts at small 
technological changes. Commercialization is another important part of the innovative 
process that involves uncertainty. Many marvelous technological advances were 
commercial flops. A country that successfully commercializes fundamental developments 
made elsewhere can have an excellent growth record, while a country that makes 
fundamental developments that its domestic firms are unable to commercialize will have 
a poor growth record.  
Because firms are making R&D choices under uncertainty, there is no unique line of 
behavior that maximizes their expected profits—if there were, all equally well-informed 
competing firms would be seeking the same breakthrough made in the same way. 
Because of the absence of a unique best line of behavior, firms should be visualized as 
groping into an uncertain future in a purposeful and profit-seeking manner (instead of 
maximizing the expected value of future profits).
9 The absence of maximization implies 
the absence of a unique optimum allocation of resources. The absence of an optimal 
allocation in turn implies that policy analysis based on removing impediments to 
achieving this optimum (standard piecemeal welfare analysis) is inapplicable. The 
profound effects for policy of this conclusion are briefly studies in Section V.
10     
Because of the fundamental uncertainties, competition in innovation cannot be 
guaranteed to select the best technology. For reasons analyzed by Arthur (1988), 
absorbing barriers, lock-in effects, and first-in or first-success advantages can easily arise. 
Because the losing technology is never developed to its full extent, we often never know 
what its full potential was.   
                                                 
9 This approach to the behavior of firms has a long lineage going back at least to the work of Herbert 
Simon. Later it was pioneered in relation to growth and technical change in the seminal book by Richard 
Nelson and Sidney Winter (1982). 
10 I have studied these policy implications in a series of articles, many of which are co-authored with 
Kenneth Carlaw. See for example (2000) and the references therein. [RG L FN] 
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5. Scale effects 
New technologies are often accompanied by reductions in unit costs of production 
associated with an increase in the scale of output. These are not scale effects as defined in 
economic theory and have nothing to do with indivisibilities. Instead, they are inherent in 
the three-dimensional geometry, the physics and the chemistry of the natural world. 
Technological improvements often allow these scale effects to be further exploited by 
permitting an increased scale of output. For example, the heat loss in a smelter is 
proportional to the area of its surface, while the amount that can be smelted is 
proportional to the volume of the smelter. Thus, there are cost economies in building 
larger smelters. But smelter size is limited by the available technology. In the 19th 
century, the development of better pumps to force air into smelters permitted an increase 
in the size of smelter thus lowering costs. Many similar examples exist and these help to 
account for the common observation of a technology that allows an increase in the scale 
of operations being accompanied by a fall in costsbut not for the reason envisaged in 
the abstract theory of scale effects. (This point is elaborated in Lipsey 2001.) 
II. TWO VIEWS OF GROWTH AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 
11 
To discuss technological change and economic dynamism, we need a theoretical model to 
act as a framework. The standard neo-classical model, which is shown in the first part of 
Figure 1, shows inputs passing through a macro-production function to produce the 
nation’s output, as measured by its gross domestic product (GDP). (Figure 1 is at the end 
of the paper.) Institutions, and all other structural components, are hidden in the “black 
box” of the aggregate production function, having helped to determine the function’s 
form. Technological change is only observable in this model by its effects on productivity 
(as measured by such variables as total factor productivity, TFP, or labor productivity, 
Y/L). So there is no way in which changes in technology and in productivity can be 
independently observed. For example, the model does not allow us to observe the 
coexistence of rapid technological change and slow productivity growth. It is the non-
separation of those two phenomena that gives rise to productivity puzzles in periods 
when independent evidence suggests that technology is changing rapidly but productivity 
is changing only slowly or not at all. To discover the circumstances in which rapid 
technological change will or will not be accompanied by rapid productivity growth, we 
cannot employ a model that equates technological change with productivity growth.   
                                                 
11 This section is based on a Chapter in Lipsey, Bekar and Carlaw (in preparation). The model that follows 
is not intended as a full description of the economy. All we need at this point is a fuller description than is 
provided by the neoclassical aggregate production function. In our book now in preparation, we distinguish 
technological and scientific knowledge and allow for social and other structures that are not included in our 
facilitating structure.  
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Our formulation is designed to separate changes in technology from changes in 
productivity and to reveal some of the elements of the neoclassical black box that 
research shows to be important for economic growth. Because this model makes the 
economy’s structure explicit, and is also in line with much micro economic research on 
the evolution of technology, we call it a “structuralist-evolutionary” (“S-E”) model. Since 
it breaks open the black box, we call it an “S-E decomposition”. 
A. Overview 
In ordinary parlance, the term technology is used rather loosely to refer both to 
specifications, designs and blue prints on the one hand and their embodiment in specific 
items of capital equipment on the other. Neoclassical growth theory also does not 
distinguish these concepts.  
In contrast, we make a sharp distinction between technological knowledge on the one 
hand and its embodiment in specific items and organizations on the other. Thus, our 
theory separates technological knowledge from the capital goods that embody much of it, 
making the latter a part of what we call the economy’s “facilitating structure.” The model 
also separately specifies public policies and the policy structures designed to give them 
effect. 
B. Definitions 
The six main categories in this model are shown in the second part of Figure 1.  
Technological knowledge: This is the idea set of everything that can create economic 
value. The classes of technological knowledge are: product technologies, which are the 
specifications of the products that can be produced, where products refer to both 
intermediate and final goods as well as services; process technologies, which are the 
specifications of the processes that are, or currently could be, employed to produce these 
goods and services; organizational technologies, which are the specifications of how 
such value-creating activities as R&D, production, management, distribution and 
marketing, are organized.
12  Notice that our concept of technology is wider than the 
definition often used; it covers all codifiable knowledge of how to create all forms of 
economic value. (Tacit knowledge is part of human capital and hence a part of the 
facilitating structure.)
13 Where the meaning is clear, we use the term technology to refer 
to technological knowledge and/or its physical embodiment. Where the distinction 
between technological knowledge and its embodiment matters, we use separate terms. 
                                                 
12 Product, process and organizational technologies include those directed at producing research results. 
13 Our intention is not to downgrade tacit knowledge as some readers have thought. Instead, it is merely to 
classify it where it belongs, as part embodied knowledgein this case, knowledge embodied in people 
rather than in such inanimate things as capital goods and firm layouts.   
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The facilitating structure: We define the facilitating structure as the realization set of 
technological knowledge; it embodies that knowledge. To be useful, the great majority of 
technologies must be embodied in one way or another. The facilitating structure is 
comprised of the following:  
•  all physical capital,  
•  people and all human capital that resides in them, including tacit knowledge of how 
to operate existing value-creating facilities,   
•  the organization of production facilities, including labor practices,  
•  the managerial and financial organization of firms,  
•  the geographical location of firms and industries,  
•  industrial concentration,  
•  all infrastructure,  
•  all private-sector financial institutions, and financial instruments. 
Inputs: For us, inputs are the basic materials that are transformed into outputs by the 
production process that is embedded in the facilitating structure. Our inputs are what the 
classical economists called “Land”, which is physical land and all natural resources.
14   
                                                 
14 This definition of inputs raises the question: Why do we exclude the traditional inputs of capital and 
labor from our input set? Our answer with respect to capital is that it is a man-made factor of production, 
which embodies technological knowledge. The analysis of its place in the productive process and of its 
slow change in response to changing technological knowledge is best accomplished if we place it in the 
facilitating structure. As with all definitions, this is a matter of its usefulness, not of right or wrong. Our 
answer with respect to labor is that people are analytically similar to capital and, for consistency, we put 
them in the same category as physical capital. Theories often make the analytical distinction between pure 
“unskilled” labor  and the human capital that is embodied in labor. But a genuinely unskilled person who 
embodied no learned human capital would be totally unemployable and hence of no economic value. From 
the time of birth, humans learn. They constantly acquire human capital and this knowledge is what makes 
them valuable as productive agents. So a laborer can be regarded in exactly the same way as capital. An 
item of physical capital is made of basic materials that have characteristics and that are formed into shapes 
that embody the technological knowledge without which the basic materials would be useless. Similarly, a 
newly born infant has characteristics. The grown worker has acquired a vast amount of human capital, 
without which he or she would be valueless. Thus, from our point of view, a laborer is as much a produced 
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"Land" is set apart from the other traditional "inputs" because the only truly exogenous 
inputs are those provided by nature. Agricultural land, forests, fish, all the natural 
materials, including ores and chemicals, are the basic materials. They are fed into the 
productive system that is embedded in the facilitating structure and are transformed by 
the services of capital and labor into outputs (what we call a performance variable).  
Public policy: Public policy is the idea set covering the specification of the objectives of 
public policy as expressed in legislation, rules, regulations, procedures and precedents, as 
well as the specification of the means of achieving them, as expressed in the design and 
command structure of public sector institutions from the police force to government 
departments to international bodies. Public policy is made and changed by public sector 
agents such as legislatures and courts.  
The policy structure: The policy structure is the realization set that provides the means of 
achieving public policies. It is embodied in public sector institutions and also includes the 
humans who staff  these organizations and whose human capital embodies the knowledge 
related to the design and operation of public sector institutions, i.e., institutional 
competence. (Note the parallel with technology and its embodiment in capital goods 
which are a part of the facilitating structure.)  
Economic performance: We refer to the system’s economic performance rather than just 
its output since we wish to include more variables than just its GDP. Economic 
performance includes aggregate GDP, its growth rate, its breakdown among sectors, and 
among such broadly defined groupings as goods production and service production; 
aggregate GNP and its distribution among size and functional classes; total employment 
and unemployment and its distribution among such sub-groups as sectors and skill 
classes; “bads" such as pollution and other harmful environmental effects. 
C. Behavior 
1. Overview 
At any particular time, the facilitating structure, in combination with primary inputs, 
produces economic performance. That structure is in turn influenced by technological 
knowledge and public policy. The introduction of any important new technology, or a 
radical improvement in an old technology, induces complex changes in the whole of the 
facilitating and policy structures. The full effects of any technical change on performance 
will not be felt until all the elements of the facilitating and policy structures have been 
                                                                                                                                                 
factor as is a piece of physical capital and each adjusts with lags when the needs of the productive process 
change. 
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adjusted to fit the newly embodied technology.
15 The performance of the economy at any 
moment in time is determined by, among other things, the compatibility of technology 
with those structures. 
To study the behavior of our variables, we assume that all elements of the model are 
initially fully adjusted to the existing technologies. We then introduce a single exogenous 
change in one of the elements of the model and study the induced changes. This 
comparative static equilibrium analysis is used solely for purposes of understanding how 
the elements of the structure fit together. In practice, we expect the entire system to be 
evolving continuously, never reaching anything remotely resembling either a static 
equilibrium or a balanced growth path.  
Starting from equilibrium, a change in technological knowledge will induce changes in 
the facilitating structure, in policy, and in performance. We take these in turn.  
2. Adjustment of the facilitating structure 
We mention just four of the important points that are related to the link between 
technology and structure.  
First, if elements of technology change, various elements of the facilitating structure will 
need to change adaptively. For example, the technology of electricity generation had to 
be embodied in new electric motors, new generating stations (first using steam, then 
water power), new distribution networks and a host of other new types of capital. When 
electricity replaced steam to power factories the optimal size of plant increased, as did 
                                                 
15 Some readers of earlier versions of this construction have complained that it was too "vague" for their 
liking. We finally discovered that “vague” meant that the variables could not all be measured on a 
numerical scale in the way that the inputs into the neoclassical production function can be defined as index 
numbers. We have two main responses. First, many of the variables that research shows to be important 
causes of technological change, such as the effectiveness of property rights protection, are not measurable 
as simple scalar values (at least with current measurement techniques). Second, the measured magnitudes 
used in neoclassical growth theory conceal some vagueness in their relations to the theoretical concepts that 
they purport to measure. What, for example, is meant by the concept of a given amount of pure capital 
when the capital is, in reality, a collection of heterogeneous goods? What does it mean to say that we have 
x% more of this pure capital than we had a century ago, although that real capital embodies very different 
technologies? It is all very well to say that the meaning is in the definition of the index number that we use 
to measure this concept, but if we cannot point to a real world counterpart of the concept of pure capital, we 
are involved in (possibly necessary) vagueness  that our precise index number measures only conceal. 
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concentration in manufacturing industries. Geographic location was also altered because 
power could now be consumed in places widely dispersed from where it was generated. 
Human capital changed because machine operators required far less skill to handle the 
reliable electrically driven machines tools that replaced the less reliable steam driven 
machines.  
Second, new technologies are typically first operated in a structure designed for their 
predecessors. (Consider electric motors in factories laid out for steam power, computers 
in offices organized around hard copy records, and early TV shows made in studios 
designed and staffed for radio.
16) Thus, at any moment in time, the facilitating structure 
may be well or poorly adapted to any given state of technology. For example, labor 
practices with respect to job demarcation that were good adaptations to the Fordist 
production methods have not yet been fully adjusted to newer Toyotaist production 
methods.   
Third, there are substantial inertias that resist change in most of the elements of the 
structure. Capital is often highly durable and will not be replaced by new capital 
embodying some superior technology as long as its variable costs of operation can be 
covered. The new pattern of industrial location and firm concentration will not be 
finalized until all the firms and plants are adjusted to the new technology. The optimal 
design of plant and management practices may not be obvious after the introduction of a 
new technology (as was the case with both steam and electricity). The understanding of 
what is needed by way of new infrastructure may take time, as will its design and 
construction (witness long Canadian discussion about the new information highway). 
New requirements for human capital must be established and the appropriate training 
devised (both on the job and in school).     
Fourth, this period of adjustment is often "conflict ridden" (Freeman and Perez’s term). 
First, old methods and organizations that worked well, often for decades, begin to 
function poorly in the  new situation and often become dysfunctional. Second, the 
uncertainty accompanying any radical new innovations implies that there will be many 
different but defensible judgments of what adaptations are actually needed. Third, users 
may mistrust new technologies and/or take a long time to accept and adjust to them. 
Consider, for one dramatic example, the current conflicts associated with many of the 
aspects of biotechnology.   
3. Adjustment of policy and the policy structure 
Changes in technology and the facilitating structure typically require adaptations in 
policies and in the policy structures that are their instruments. For example, technological 
changes often turn natural monopolies into highly competitive industries (in the Austrian 
sense of the term as discussed in a previous footnote). The post office once had a natural 
monopoly in the delivery of hard copy messages but today that job can be done by 
courier, fax, e-mail, satellite link, and a host of other technologies, which have made this 
                                                 
16 What this last trivial example shows is that at all levels of technology structure and newly introduced  
technologies are often incompatible. 
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activity highly competitive.  A new technology can also do the reverse by introducing 
scale economies large enough for natural monopolies to emerge in what was previously 
an oligopolistic industry in which firms rigorously competed with each other. 
Adjustments in policy and the policy structure tend to occur with long lags. Uncertainty 
about how the technology will evolve leaves agents unclear about what structural 
adjustments are required. This gives power to vested interests who wish to resist required 
changes. Inertias in political decision taking, plus the resistance of those who are hurt 
either by the new technologies, or by the accommodating changes in policy, can slow the 
process of adaptation. For example, decades after the ICT revolution made prohibitions 
on interstate banking obsolete, the US congress was still arguing over the revisions of the 
Glass Stegal Act that was passed in the wake of the 1929 stock market crash.
17 
3. Changes in performance 
We have seen above that a change in technological knowledge requires a change in 
structure to make it operational, while the changes in structure often induce, or require, 
substantial changes in policies and the policy structure. Not only does new technology 
have to be embodied in new equipment, ancillary technologies need to be developed, and 
much of the facilitating structure needs to be redesigned to suit the new technology, 
which is initially operating in a structure adapted to the old. For these reasons, economic 
performance typically continues to change even after the new technology is in place 
because the facilitating and policy structures are still reacting and adapting to it. For 
example, it was decades after the introduction of electricity into factories before the 
technology completed its evolution. Electric motors first powered the single central drive 
that was typical of steam. They then powered several smaller drive shafts in the “group 
drive” that was an experiment in partial decentralization of the power system. Finally, the 
unit drive system put a separate engine on each machine tool. The flexibility of this 
arrangement then made possible a drastic alteration in the lay out of factories. Only after 
new factories with the new machines and new layouts replaced the long-lived steam 
driven ones was the full effects of electricity on industrial output and productivity felt, 
several decades after the first use of electricity in factories. 
                                                 
17 Not only does policy need to react to changes in technology and in the facilitating structure, it may also 
be changed pro-actively in an attempt to alter technology or the structure. For example, a policy that 
directly subsidizes research on some new technology is operating directly on technology.  A policy that 
encourages the establishment of R&D labs or richer links between the private sectors and universities is 
altering the facilitating structure in the expectation that these changes will influence the rate and nature of 
technological change. 
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D. Applications   
One of the most important insights that follows from an S-E decomposition is that there 
are no necessary relations among the magnitudes of changes in technology, in the 
facilitating and policy structures, and in performance. Because changes in technology are 
only observable in neo-classical models by their effects on productivity (as measured by 
such variables as TFP or Y/L), many (probably most) economists assume that big 
changes in technology should be associated with big changes in productivity and are 
puzzled when they are not. But there is no reason to be puzzled.  New technologies will 
replace older ones as long as they promise some gain in profitability. Sometimes the 
difference between the productivity of the old and the new is large and at other times it is 
small. Neoclassical observers often doubt the reality of major technological changes 
because productivity is not changing rapidly. But as the S-E decomposition emphasizes, 
there is no necessary relation between these variables. Current changes in productivity 
may or may not be well measured, but there is no paradox in there being major changes 
in technology with no accompanying rapid changes in measured productivity. This is 
what happened, for example, during the first phase of the Industrial Revolution when 
some of the new automated textile machinery was installed in sheds and driven by hand, 
while the rest was placed in small water-powered factories. A neoclassical observer 
would conclude that nothing important was happening to technology because TFP, Y/L, 
and real wages were not changing much. In fact, however, the technological basis for 
everything that happened later was being put in place, including transferring production 
from cottages to factories. To repeat the key point made earlier: To study the 
circumstances under which rapid technological and structural change will and will not 
be accompanied by rapid productivity growth, we cannot employ a model that equates 
technological change with productivity growth.  
A second important insight that follows from our S-E theory is that there is no necessary 
relation between the magnitude of the change in technology and the changes it induces in 
the facilitating structure. Some important new technologies, including the laser, fit well 
into the existing facilitating structure and require few structural changes. Others, such as 
electricity and the computer, require massive changes in the facilitating and policy 
structures, changes that radically alter our way of life. What most observers see are the 
changes in the facilitating structure. These are then often confused with changes in 
technology. For example, when production moved out of the smaller proto-factories and 
into the great steam-driven factories in the early nineteenth century, this was a major 
change in the facilitating structure. Indeed, this was the stage of the Industrial Revolution 
when both the facilitating structure and performance changed most rapidlythe large 
industrial  towns made their appearance while productivity and real wages finally began 
to rise steadily. Yet no new basic technologies were involved. All that happened was that 
the existing steam engines were combined with the existing automated textile machines. 
Many second order improvements were required in both technologies. But no great 
technological revolution was involved, for these had come earlier. Nothing but confusion 
can result when technology, structure and performance are all changing in different ways 
and the events are interpreted by a theory that does not distinguish these. 
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III. GENERAL PURPOSE TECHNOLOGIES 
The overall technology systems of all growing economies evolve along paths that include 
both small incremental improvements and occasional jumps. To distinguish these, 
investigators often define two categories. An innovation is incremental if it is an 
improvement to an existing technology. An innovation is radical if it could not have 
evolved through incremental improvements in the technology that it displaces—e.g., 
artificial fabrics could not have evolved out of the natural fabrics that they displaced in 
many uses. 
An extreme form of radical innovation is called a general purpose technology (GPT). 
GPTs share some important common characteristics: they begin as fairly crude 
technologies with a limited number of uses; they evolve into much more complex 
technologies with dramatic increases in the range of their use across the economy, and in 
the range of economic outputs that they help to produce. This evolution typically takes 
many decades, and can spread over a century. As mature technologies, they are widely 
used for a number of different purposes, and they have many complementarities in the 
sense of co-operating with many other technologies. A mature GPT is defined formally as 
a technology that is widely used, has many uses, and has many complementarities with 
other existing technologies.
18  
In our study of the history of technological change, we have identified about two dozen 
GPTs that have had really major impacts on the social and economic order, changing 
almost all aspects of society. They fall into five main categories, materials, energy, 
transportation, information & communication and organization. In chronological order, 
these are the domestication of crops, the domestication of animals, the wheel, the 
invention of writing, the invention of bronze, the introduction of iron, the water wheel, 
the three-masted sailing vessel, the steam engine, the factory system, the dynamo, easily 
manufactured steel, the internal combustion engine, the automobile, the airplane, mass 
production, the computer (and all of its derivatives such as the internet), lean production 
(Toyotaism) the laser, methods of creating new materials, biotechnology (just beginning 
to make its effects felt), and nanotechnology (in the future).
19      
A. Evolution of a GPT 
A technology that eventually evolves into a GPT invariably starts in a relatively crude 
form with a limited number of uses (often one), and slowly develops the whole range of 
characteristics that we associate with a GPT. This initial evolutionary path is related to 
                                                 
18 For a detailed consideration of these characteristics and a development of the definition that follows in 
the text see Lipsey, Bekar and Carlaw (1998a). 
19 I have discussed these past technologies in Lipsey and Bekar 1995 and Lipsey, Bekar and Carlaw 1988, 
and the upcoming ones in Lipsey 1999. 
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how agents learn about new technological ideas under conditions of uncertainty  
learning by doing, learning by using, and by conscious experimentation.  
As they evolve, GPTs interact with other technologies in many different ways. Even 
when a technology that eventually becomes a GPT is introduced to meet some specific 
crisis, as was steam to deal with water in ever-deepening English coal mines, it sooner or 
later begins to compete with technologies that are not themselves in crisis (e.g., sailing 
ships). Many of these older technologies are eventually overcome by the new technology, 
but only after a period of intense competition in which both technologies become more 
productive.  
In other cases, the new technology will quickly become superior to the older competing 
technology. For example, when electric motors challenged steam in factories, they 
quickly established their supremacy as a power delivery system once the unit drive was 
established. Few new steam-driven factories were built thereafter (although existing 
steam-driven factories lasted for decades). In other cases, the initial margin of advantage 
is small and the transition correspondingly slow, as was the case when steam competed 
with water power in factories. 
A new GPT often cooperates with an established technology that it eventually challenges. 
This was the case when early steam engines were sometimes used to lift water to help 
drive water wheels, and early airplanes delivered passengers to the ports used by 
transoceanic liners. When the new technology becomes dominant, it sometimes 
internalizes, or cooperates with, a revised version of the old technology. For example, the 
steam turbine, a combination of waterwheel and steam technologies, remains in use today 
as an electricity generating device.     
In some cases, there may be little or no competition with the established technologies 
because the new technology fills a new niche. Regular, long-distance, trans-oceanic trade 
was created by the three masted sailing ship which had no established marine technology 
with which to compete over long distances. The internal combustion engine provided 
services which existing steam technologies could notfast starting engines that were 
efficient at small horse power ratings and had relatively low weight/power ratios. Only 
when it was combined with electricity, did the hybrid diesel-electric engine seriously 
challenge steam on such major uses as ships and railways.  
Sometimes a new GPT is complementary with a different type of existing technology. 
This was true, for example, of power and materials during the Industrial Revolution. 
Stronger materials were required before high pressure steam engines could be perfected.  
In every case considered above, the full effect on productivity depends on the difference 
between the productivity of the new GPT and that of the technology it displaces.  Since 
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both technologies evolve, the effect is time dependant and cannot be predicted solely 
from a knowledge of the new GPT's own characteristics.
 20 
Because, as already observed, the evolution of any technology is uncertain and hence 
difficult to predict, there is great variation in the stage of its evolution at which a new 
GPT is recognized as such. At one extreme, its potential may be recognized very early. 
This was the case with electricity. Ever since the invention of the voltaic cell in 1800, 
electricity was touted as an extremely important technology with massive potential. This 
was long before the invention of the dynamo in 1887 made electricity available in a form 
that could eventually fulfill its expectations. At the other extreme, a GPT may undergo 
decades of evolution before its revolutionary potential is recognized. For example, when 
computers were first commercialized after the Second World War, the civilian demand 
was estimated to be five. It took decades, and many ancillary innovations, before the 
computer was recognized as an all pervasive technology.  
When (sooner or later) a GPT is actually perceived as an important new technology, it 
usually falls short of the expectations that are generated about its future developmentin 
timing if not in eventual scope. This leads to a period of disillusionment followed by 
eventual surprise that the first expectations were correct. This uncertainty is often 
reflected in financial markets. Swings between optimism and pessimism cause major 
swings in share values and in company fortunes, of which the latest were being observed 
in late 2000 - early 2001. These swings could not happen if the evolution of new GPTs 
were not subject to high degrees of uncertainty.    
B. Structural Adjustments  
Every new GPT induces changes in the facilitating structure, although the extent and 
magnitude of these adjustments varies greatly from one GPT to another.  
1. Long-term changes in structure  
New physical capital: The evolution of a new GPT is accompanied by important changes 
in a wide range of technologies. Changes occur in both the internal makeup of stand-
                                                 
20 The points in this section are important qualification’s to keep in mind when interpreting existing 
theoretical models of GPTs (see Helpman 1998). In these, all GPTs are treated the same; their effects are 
inherent in their internal structure; GPTs are instantly recognized as such at the moment of their discovery, 
their future evolution is then fully anticipated; only one GPT is assumed to be evolving at any point in time. 
The fact that modeling even so simple a version of a GPT is technically very difficult makes me pessimistic 
about the time it will take to develop more applicable modelsor whether this will ever be done. It also 
shows how ridiculous is the commonly held view that if something cannot be formally modeled it is not 
economics.  
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alone capital goods, and in technology systems (grouping of stand-alone capital goods 
that cooperate with each other). Often the latter requires restructuring of the cooperating 
capital goods before the full potential of the technology system can be realized. A full 
explication of the rich experiences that fall into this category would require a paper in 
itself. (For more details see Lipsey, Bekar and Carlaw 1998b.)  
Human capital: Required skills change with virtually every GPT. In British mines, the 
mule and horse handlers required much more skill than the drivers of the power-driven 
coal carriers that replaced them. Steam driven factories and machines required their 
machinists to be skilled in maintenance and repair, but the electric motor was more 
reliable so repair and maintenance was devolved to a few specialists.
21 
Reorganization of production facilities: A reorganization of the production process is 
usually required before the full potential of a new GPT can be realized. Early British 
textile factories were powered by animals, people, or water. The introduction of steam 
engines initially caused only a small increase in productivity. Large gains were not 
realized until the entire factory had been fully redesigned and its layout adapted to the 
power requirements of steam. Also, many ancillary innovations were needed before the 
full potential for speed and reliability of steam driven equipment could be realized. 
Reorganization of management practices: New technologies often require new 
management structures. The early proto-factories of the First Industrial Revolution were 
small and typically owner managed. The large factories that followed the introduction of 
steam required a much more complex management structure and a new corporate form of 
finance to bring in a large number of non-managing investors.   
Geographical relocation: New GPTs often alter optimal locational patterns. Water power 
restricted production to sites with reliable, fast-moving water flows. Although steam 
factories could be located anywhere, the cost of transporting coal was of major 
importance and power had to be used where it was generated. With electricity, the 
generation and use of power was separated spatially, freeing industry from the 
considerations of local power sources. Thus, the efficient geographical location of 
production facilities changed radically when steam replaced water, and when electricity 
replaced steam. The world still awaits the development of a widely applicable power 
source where the generation of the power can be separated in time from its use.  
Industrial concentration: Different technologies have different inherent scale economies 
and these exert a major influence on industrial concentration. The use of water power 
required relatively small production units because the total horse power that any one site 
could generate was limited. Steam created large scale economies since the efficient size 
of a steam engine produced much more horse power than did the most efficient water 
wheel.  
Changes in Infrastructure: New technologies typically require new infrastructure. For 
example, some of the most important cost components of early steam engine installations 
                                                 
21  These observations provide a warning of the dangers of the assumption often made by growth theorists 
that the skill bias of successive new technologies always changes in the same direction.   
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were the sheds that housed the machine and coal, the foundational slab for the machine, 
and other micro-infrastructure requirements. Macro-infrastructure requirements included 
railway tracks, suitably designed ports, roads, and factories.  
2. Transitional impacts on the facilitating structure 
There are many reasons why the structural adjustments associated with the evolution of a 
new GPT are typically long-drawn-out and conflict-ridden. First, the required structural 
changes are subject to the same uncertainties as are the evolution of the GPT itself. The 
decisions that firms must take concerning the timing of the investment in new 
technologies, geographic relocations, size of firm (and hence industrial concentration) 
and internal financial structure, depend on many other structural adjustments. The 
uncertainty associated with the future evolutionary path of any new GPT implies that 
there is no optimal response in the facilitating (or the policy) structures at each point in 
time. Thus, rational agents in both the private and public sector may disagree about 
appropriate responses, even when all have the same information. Current debates about 
the restructuring of firms, labor practices, education systems and government policies 
with respect to science, technology, industry and regulation all reveal genuine differences 
in assessment about the best responses to new technologiesdifferences not solely 
motivated by the desire to protect special interests. 
Second, many elements of the facilitating structure are characterized by large sunk costs 
which delay adjustment. This was one of the main reasons for the decades of delay in 
electrifying the whole manufacturing sector in North America and Europe. Also, many 
older workers find it difficult to retrain for the new technologies and the full adjustment 
may have to wait until the older generation is replaced by a new generation trained in the 
requirements of the new technologies.  
Third, the required changes in the facilitating structure destroy many existing sources of 
rents and create many new ones. Those with vested interests in old sources of economic 
rent resist the changes. Since they often have substantial political power and long periods 
of conflict typically occur. For example, the Luddites, who were skilled craft persons, 
resisted the integration and mechanization of production that accompanied the Industrial 
Revolution in England. Similarly, many unions resisted the reorganization of work 
induced by the lean production methods of Toyotaism.   
Fourth, some elements of structure do not respond easily because they are determined by 
non-economic forces such as custom, religion or public policy. The effects of a new 
technology on performance may be influenced by this unresponsiveness. For example, a 
public policy that resists the adjustment of the facilitating structure will result in a 
different economic performance than would occur if those adjustments were left wholly 
to the market.  
3. Interactions with public policy and the policy structure 
Changes in Public Policy: Technological changes and the resulting change in the 
facilitating structure often require major changes in policy. Natural monopolies are 
created and destroyed as one dominant technology supplants another. Competition policy 
needs to respond quickly to such changes. Property rights need to be defined over new 
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technologies, as well as over their cooperating factorse.g., streams that powered water 
wheels and airwaves for radio, TV and cellular phones, and genetic discoveries. New 
policies are required with respect to labor practices, competition and natural monopolies. 
Changes in the volume and nature of foreign trade and investment call for new forms of 
international cooperation and control.  Covering these issues of public policy in any detail 
requires at least a paper. (See, for example, Lipsey 1997.)  
Changes in the policy structure: Some changes are typically needed in the institutions 
that give effect to public policy. This is particularly apparent today, at the international 
level. ICT-assisted globalization is requiring international supervision of many issues 
involving trade and investment. The importance to most countries of a relatively free 
flow of international trade and investment has led them to transfer power over trade 
restrictions to supra national bodies such as the World Trade Organization, the EU, the 
NAFTA, and a host of other trade liberalizing institutions. The interrelation of trade and 
investment brought about by the ICT revolution has caused modern trade liberalizing 
agreements to be expanded to include measures to ensure the free flow and "national 
treatment" of foreign investment. The controversies over policies for globalization in 
general and the WTO in particular illustrate once again how these adjustments are so 
often conflict ridden. 
IV. THE ICT REVOLUTION 
The GPT revolution through which we are currently living is the revolution in 
Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs).
22 These are a cluster of new 
technologies centered around the computer but also including faxes, satellite 
transmissions, lasers and fiber optics (many of which were developed with the assistance 
of computers). 
When computers were initially introduced, they entered structures designed for the paper 
world, merely substituting for human hands and minds. Before they could really pay off, 
administration and production had to be redesigned both physically and in their command 
structures. Slowly, the whole process of producing, designing, delivering, and marketing 
goods and services was, and still is being, reorganized along lines dominated by 
computing technologies. As more and more of the needed changes in the facilitating 
structure are identified and accomplished, we can expect that, as with electricity, the 
latent power of the new technology to raise productivity will be seen in measured 
productivity growth—as it is in many sectors already.  
A. The Organization of Firms 
Administratively, the old hierarchical firm, organized on the military command model in 
which large numbers of middle managers passed information and commands up and 
down, has given way to the new, more flexible management form of semi-independent 
groups linked laterally rather than vertically. Many middle managers have lost their jobs 
in the process.  
                                                 
22 Plus the very early stages of the biotechnology revolution.  
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Another example is provided by Deiter Ernst (2001) in has paper for this conference: 
“During the critical early phase, FDI exposed Taiwanese workers and 
managers to new organizational techniques, gradually eroding 
traditional, highly authoritarian and ultimately inefficient 
management practices.  Over time, the need to comply to some 
minimum international quality standards gave rise to broader 
learning effects that spilled over to a wide spectrum of local 
enterprises due to the high turnover in Taiwan´s skilled labor 
market.” 
This is typical of the kind of shock that technological change administers to 
organizational techniques. It shows the endogenous nature of technological change and 
the importance of openness in forcing producers to learn about and adopt the standards of 
world marketsa problem that is non-existent in those neoclassical growth models that 
assume that the same production function applies to all countries in the world. 
Ernst (2001) provides another excellent example that illustrates the power of GPTs.  
“Historically, small, family-owned firms have played an important 
role in the development of Taiwan´s electronics industry. Yet, this 
from of business organization is now coming under increasing 
pressure, and appears to be ill-equipped to deal with the new 
competitive requirements. Family bonds erode, especially when the 
firm has to move production overseas and loose networks between 
family-owned SMEs are unable to raise the capital required for 
increasing fixed investments and R&D outlays. As a result, Taiwanese 
SMEs had to develop a variety of linkages with third parties and to 
experiment with new forms of managing inter-organizational 
linkages. In what follows, we will highlight three peculiar 
developments: informal peer group networks; integration into loose 
cross-sectoral conglomerates; and the development of sector-specific 
business groups.” 
This is similar to what happened in late medieval and early modern Italy where the 
emergence of new kinds of long distance commerce put stresses on the traditional family 
methods of doing business. Eventually these gave way to methods that allowed strangers 
to participate in business ventures in ways that were seldom needed before. As is typical 
in such changing situations, those who were able to innovate in new institutional 
structures more suited to the new demands of technology and commerce prospered and 
those who could not languished. 
That much has already happened. The uncertainties attached to the structural impact of 
major innovations are clearly seen in conjectures about what kinds of organizational 
adjustments will occur in the future as a result of the continuing ICT revolution. For one 
example, Malone and Laubacher (1998) foresee a fundamental transformation caused by 
the growth of the “e-lance economy”—an economy dominated by the electronically 
linked freelancers.   
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The coordinating technologies of the industrial era—the train, and the 
telegraph, the automobile and the telephone, the mainframe 
computer—made internal transactions not only possible but also 
advantageous. …But with the introduction of powerful personal 
computers and broad electronic networks—the coordinating 
technologies of the twenty-first century—the economic equation 
changes (p147). Because information can be shared instantaneously 
and inexpensively among many people in many locations, the value of 
centralised decision making and expensive bureaucracies decreases. 
…the new coordination techniques allow us to return to the 
preindustrial organisational model of tiny autonomous 
businesses…conducting transactions with one another in a 
market…[with] one crucial difference: electronic networks enable 
these microbusinesses to tap into the global reservoirs of information, 
expertise, and financing that used to be available only to large 
companies. (p148) …The fundamental unit of such an economy is not 
the corporation but the individual. These electronically connected 
freelancers—e-lancers—join together into fluid and temporary 
networks to produce and sell goods and services. When the job is 
done…the network dissolves, and its members become independent 
agents again, circulating through the economy, seeking the next 
assignment. (p146)”  
Should anything like this come to pass the structural adjustment would be enormous. 
There would be: 
“…fundamental changes in virtually every business function…. 
Supply chains would become ad hoc structures, assembled to fit the 
needs of a particular project and disassembled when the project 
ended. Manufacturing capacity would be bought and sold in an open 
market, and independent, specialised manufacturing concerns would 
undertake small batch order of a variety of brokers, design shops, and 
even consumers. Marketing would be performed in some cases by 
brokers, in other cases by small companies that would own brands 
and certify the quality of the merchandise sold under them. In still 
other cases, the ability of consumers to share product information on 
the Internet would render marketing obsolete; consumers would 
simply “swarm” around the best offerings. Financing would come less 
from retained earnings and big equity markets and more from 
venture capitalists and interested individuals.” (p 150)       
Many e-lance enterprises have already come and gone. The vision of a major e-lance 
sector, even if it only covers say 20 percent of the whole economy, is unlike anything 
ever seen since the First Industrial Revolution destroyed the Putting-Out System. 
This discussion illustrates that the major structural changes in the organization of 
productive units is not yet over; that it will continue at a rapid rate; and that there are 
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major surprises yet to come. For example, David Mowery’s paper at  this conference 
describes radical changes in the electronics industry, many of which are similar to those 
just outlined with respect to the e-lance economy.  
B. Economies of Scope and Scale  
As GPTs have done in the past, the ICT revolution is altering scale economies in complex 
ways. Whereas economies of scale in manufacturing were a driving force in the post-war 
expansion of many industries, increasingly they are becoming either non-important or 
redefined. The introduction of computers and other information technologies, plus the use 
of advanced materials, have drastically lowered the minimum efficient scale of 
production for many individual product lines. One firm’s fixed costs of computers and 
other facilities are covered by producing many product lines so that economies of scope 
become more important than economies of scale. 
The organization of service production has also changed dramatically. On the one hand, 
firms operating on a global scale in law, accounting, and other traditional services are 
replacing many of the older individual operators. On the other hand, computers, plus a 
host of related electronic devices such as faxes, photocopiers, and modems allow many 
independent providers of services to work out of home rather than where their services 
are consumed. The internet allows these individuals access to masses of information and 
the ability to interact with others that was formerly only available to employees of very 
large corporations. If the first industrial revolution took work out of the home, the 
computer revolution is, at least partially, putting it back, with profound social and 
economic consequences.  
C. Deindustrialization and Servicization 
The new technologies have accentuated a trend towards servicization that has been 
observable throughout most of this century. It has a number of sources. First, the shift is 
partly definitional. A range of service activities that used to be conducted in-house by 
manufacturing firms, and so recorded as manufacturing activities, is now contracted out 
to firms specialized in activities such as product design, marketing, accounting, cleaning, 
and maintenance, and so recorded as service activities. Second, on the demand side, the 
shift to services is partly driven by consumers’ tastes. As real incomes rise, people spend 
a lower proportion of their incomes on durable consumers’ goods and a rising proportion 
on such services as medical care, travel, and restaurant eating. Third, on the supply side, 
the decline in employment in manufacturing is partly a measure of its success in 
producing more with less inputs, especially labor. Fourth, also on the supply side, the ICT 
revolution has encouraged many service activities by making them more efficient.  
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D. Locational Effects: Globalization
23  
Globalization, the rapid acceleration of a process that has also been going on for over a 
century, is due in large part to the ICT revolution. The effects on manufacturing follow 
from four distinct developments. First, the new ICTs have allowed production to be 
disintegrated into a series of independent operations. Second, ICTs allow independent 
units to be co-coordinated in ways that were impossible in the past. Seventy five years 
ago, even where production was split between many component suppliers, these had to be 
located within relatively short distances of each other so that components could be 
delivered to assemblers when and where they were required. Third, improvements in 
transportation technologies, particularly containerization and the development of very 
large ships, have greatly reduced the costs of shipping goods around the world. Today, 
with the ability to co-ordinate worldwide and to ship products at very low cost, 
component parts can be produced anywhere in the world in the right quantities and 
shipped to arrive when and where they are needed with little error. Fourth, economic 
policy has changed in most countries in the direction of openness. Trade barriers have 
been drastically reduced and foreign investment made easier and less threatened by 
nationalistic policies of harassment or confiscation. Those LDCs that have opened most 
and earliest, such as the Asian NICs, have prospered most. Those that have stayed 
relatively closed have prospered least. It is a sad travesty that the energies of so many 
youth are currently directed at harassing the very developments that have brought relative 
prosperity (judged by historical standards) to so many in less developed countries. 
Energies would be better directed to pressuring their own governments to lower the 
remaining trade barriers that prevent the poorest countries from exporting the products in 
which they have comparative advantages, particularly agricultural commodities and 
textiles.    
Many services are also globalizing. Ireland, the Caribbean, and India are all locations in 
which large transnational corporations, such as credit card and travel companies, do much 
of their record keeping and accounting. Software firms are also moving much of their 
coding work to places outside of North America. While India is still a relatively small 
producer of software in absolute terms, it is now one of the fastest growing sources of 
computer code in the world. When an Indian technician uses the Internet to repair some 
electronic equipment in Boston, where does the production take place? Where is the 
value created? Where should it be taxed?  
Dieter Ernst (2001) provides an excellent example of globalization. 
Globalization in the computer industry has culminated in an 
important organizational innovation, the spread of  global production 
networks (GPN)
 that integrate geographically dispersed, yet 
concentrated and locally specialized clusters. Their main purpose is to 
                                                 
23 I have discussed the implications of the new ICTs on globalization at length in Lipsey (1997) 
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exploit complementarities that result from the systemic nature of 
knowledge (Antonelli, 1999). Under certain conditions, these networks 
may enhance the migration of knowledge across firm boundaries and 
national borders; they may also improve the opportunities for 
knowledge sharing and interactive learning without co-location. 
A global network flagship company breaks down the value chain into a 
variety of discrete functions and locates them wherever they can be 
carried out most effectively, where they improve the firm’s access to 
resources and capabilities, and where they are needed to facilitate the 
penetration of important growth markets. The main purpose is to 
gain quick access to lower-cost foreign capabilities that are 
complementary to the firm´s  own competencies. Consider a stylized 
GPN: it combines a large, multi-divisional MNE (the flagship), its 
subsidiaries, affiliates and joint ventures, its suppliers and 
subcontractors, its distribution channels and value-added resellers, as 
well as its R&D alliances and a variety of cooperative agreements, 
such as standards consortia. 
None of this would have been possible without the communications networks provided 
by the ICT revolution. Can anyone doubt that these are big changes affecting many 
aspects of economic and social life? 
E. Labor   
Flexible, knowledge-intensive production techniques and a global market in the products 
produced by low skilled labor have led to a need to redefine the role of the union. No 
longer are strict, rigid job descriptions a supportable labor practice. Skill requirements for 
previously low-skilled jobs have risen as design, production and marketing increasingly 
involve creating and processing information. 
Effecting the required changes quickly has been a conflict-ridden process. To many labor 
leaders, the need to change procedures that were worked out painfully early in this 
century, and that worked well for subsequent decades, seems like some plot to exploit 
employees instead of an inevitable adjustment to new technologies.  
Both firms and workers are going through an evolution where structural relationships are 
adapting to changes in the technology. Currently it is the well paid and well educated 
who are benefiting most from the introduction of the computer in the work place and 
thus, computerization is reinforcing the polarization of incomes and jobs. Dealing with 
long-term unemployment and finding ways to diminish the proportion of the labor force 
which is unskilled and, therefore, in competition with unskilled labor world-wide are 
urgent matters for public policy in the developed nations.    
F. Social Organizations   
Ways of life are changing with the changing patterns of work. With electronic 
communication, groups of like-minded individuals are finding it easier to get together. 
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Technologies have effectively redefined our notions of time and distance (and in some 
ways have created the much-heralded global village).  
By linking people and groups, e-mail encourages work across space, 
time and group boundaries. Indeed, the absence of constraining non-
verbal cues and social controls in e-mail may make it easier to 
communicate with unknown or peripheral people than through 
face-to-face means. Such wide-ranging ties are especially useful for 
linking socially diverse people, obtaining innovative information and 
integrating organisations. (Wellman & Buxton, p.12) 
G. Policy 
Here are three illustrations of the profound changes in existing public policies that are 
occurring in response to current technological changes. First, the sophisticated 
communications produced by the ICT revolution, and the globalization that it has 
facilitated, make it impossible for governments to control international capital 
movements in the ways that they routinely did in the era of fixed exchange rates. Second, 
the increasing difficulty that governments face in dictating what their citizens will see 
and hear has curtailed the efficacy of information-restriction policies exercised by both 
dictatorships and democratic governments. Third, the assets that confer many of today's 
national competitive advantages tend to be both created and highly mobile. This severely 
restricts any individual government's ability to adopt policies that affect the value of these 
assets and that differ markedly from policies followed by other governments.  
H. Productivity 
Great concern has been expressed over the slow measured increase in productivity in 
most industrialized economies over the last 21/2 decades of the  20
th century. Indeed, 
many observers, e.g., Robert Gordon (2000), have used these low figures to argue that the 
alleged fundamental transformations caused by the ICT revolution are so much hype. 
Such views are clearly in strong opposition to those I have expressed in this paper (and at 
many earlier times. I make three points about the “productivity paradox”. The fist two 
summarize what has been said before; the third is new. 
First, very long lags exist (i) in the development of a major GPT as the range of its use 
and applications evolves (ii) as ancillary technologies are developed and (iii) as changes 
are made in all of the elements of the facilitating structure. Typically, several decades are 
required for a GPT to make a major impactand that impact may then stretch over more 
than a century as new technologies that are enabled by the GPT are developed. 
(Electricity is a prime example.) 
Second, and more fundamentally, a new technology will be instituted whenever it 
promises to be profitable. But there is no guarantee that every new technology will have 
the same effects on profits and productivity (however it is measured). Some technologies 
will bring small gains, others large gains. So the extent to which the new technology 
pervades the system and the extent of the induced changes in the facilitating structure, 
right up to deep social transformations, bear no necessary relation to the induced changes 
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in productivity or real wages. (For example, as pointed out earlier the major technological 
changes of the early Industrial Revolution were associated with small changes in  
productivity while the small technological changes associated with the introduction of 
steam engines into factories were associated with large changes in productivity.) There is 
only a paradox when neoclassical theory, which equates technology change with changes 
in TFP, is used to interpret what is going on.  
Third, total factor productivity is a very poor measure of the effects of technological 
change. (This is argued in detail in Lipsey and Carlaw 2000.) we begin that paper by 
showing that economists are not agreed on what TFP measures. Krugman (1996), Alwyn 
Young (1992), Statistics Canada (13-568) and Law (2000) all express the common view 
that TFP measures all technological change. Jorgenson (1995) and Griliches (1994) argue 
that TFP only measures the externalities associated with growth. Metcalfe (1987) argues 
that it is only valid over short periods of time. While, in another publication, Griliches 
(1995) states that it is little more than a measure for our ignorance.  
It is something of an understatement to say that all of these views cannot be correct. TFP 
means different things to different informed observers but all too many have no hesitation 
in agreeing that low TFP numbers show a low rate of technological change. Surely it is a 
scandal that a measurement that is so much relied upon is so poorly understood. 
After an extended analysis that shows many ways in which technology can change 
without being reflected in TFP changes, Lipsey and Carlaw (2000) conclude, among 
other things:  
•  All improvements in technology, such as the internal 
combustion engine, do not “clearly raise TFP. 
•  There is reason to suspect that TFP does not adequately 
reflect the increase in a firm’s capital value created by 
R&D activities that are realised through sale of intellectual 
property rather than exploitation by the firms that develop 
them. Yet these are often technological advances created 
by the use of valuable resources. 
•  TFP does not adequately capture the effects on the growth 
process of those technological changes that operate by 
lowering the cost of small industries and then allowing 
large subsequent increases in their sales and outputs, as 
happened in the automobile industry between 1905 and 
1925. 
•  TFP does not adequately measure the massive amount of 
technological change that gets embodied in physical capital 
where the change is, under some circumstances, recorded 
as an increases in the quantity of capital rather than an 
increase in productivity. 
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•  When full, long-run equilibrium does not pertain, as in the 
midst of any lagged adjustment process, the marginal 
equivalencies needed for successful aggregation do not 
obtain and it is likely that some of the increases in 
productivities of labour and capital will be recorded as 
increases in the quantities of labour and capital.  
•  New technologies often lead to large up front costs of R&D 
and learning by doing and using that are incurred in the 
expectation of future benefits that will be missed when 
current outputs are related to current costs. The amount of 
this activity may vary with the life cycle of GPTs and this 
will affect measured TFP.  
•  Neither TFP nor externalities adequately measure the 
technological complementarities by which an innovation in 
one sector confers benefit on other sectorsbenefit for 
which those in other sectors would be willing to pay but do 
not have to do so.  
It seems to us that, whatever TFP does measureand there is cause 
for concern as to how to answer that questionit emphatically does 
not measure all of technological change. While people are, of course, 
free to measure anything that seems interesting to them, the degree of 
confusion surrounding TFP, particularly the assumption that low 
TFP numbers imply a low degree of technological dynamism, would 
seem to us to justify dropping the measure completely from all 
discussions of long term economic growth. Even if that does not 
happen, as we are sure it will not, every TFP measure should carry 
the caveat: changes in TFP do not measure technological change.” 
I. Conclusion  
The scale of R&D in the new applications of ICT, the extraordinary growth of the 
software industry and related business services, the scale of investment in computerized 
equipment and in the telecommunications infrastructure, the rapid growth of industries 
supplying the ICT products and services and the use of computers within every function 
in every industry have led some observers to characterize the ICT Revolution as a 
structural change in the economy comparable to the First Industrial Revolution. Peter 
Drucker argues, with not much exaggeration, that:  
“We are clearly in the middle of this transformation...already it has 
changed the political, economic, social, and moral landscape of the 
world. No one born in 1990 could possibly imagine the world in which 
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one’s grandparents...had grown up, or the world in which one’s own 
parents had been born.” (Drucker, p 3)  
The future is hard to predict but the ICT revolution is still in full swing. Many 
applications to new products new processes and new ways of organizing activities are yet 
to be invented. Their effects will continue to reverberate through most economies during 
the first half of the 21
st century. As the century proceeds, these effects will be combined 
with those coming from two other major GPTs, first biotechnology, then nanotechnology. 
V. POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF ENDOGENOUS TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 
Neoclassical GE theory of the type developed by Arrow and Debreu underlies 
neoclassical policy advice. In that theory, tastes and technology are exogenous and 
competitive forces lead to an optimum allocation of resources. The theory abstracts from 
all of those characteristics that distinguish one economy from another, such as stage of 
development, size of economy, industrial concentration, prevalence of entrepreneurial 
talent, and administrative capabilities to run government policies. The resulting universal 
policy prescription is to alleviate market failures that prevent the optimum allocation 
from being achieved.
24 
Two branches of dissent can be distinguished. On the one hand, Romer’s branch of new 
macro growth theory stresses the nature of knowledge as being  non-rivalrous and partly 
appropriable. He points out that in many models the associated problems are ignored by 
treating knowledge like any other fully rivalrous private good that confers externalities. 
On the other hand, the structuralist-evolutionary theory considered in some detail above, 
is micro based and stresses the uncertainty that is associated with technological advance. 
Both Romer’s and the S-E approaches conclude that the neoclassical optimal allocation 
of resources is unachievable in theory, let alone in practice, and hence the policy advice 
of removing impediments to achieving that optimum is not well grounded.
25 
A. General Implications 
If endogenous technological change lies at the heart of economic growth, as stressed by 
S-E theory, governments cannot avoid influencing growth since almost every government 
policy, including those related to education, competition, and redistribution, will have 
some influence on the amount, location and direction of technological change. Writing in 
                                                 
24 The theory of second best (Lipsey and Lancaster 1956) is a skeleton in the closet of this type of 
piecemeal policy advice. Since a first best optimum is in practice unachievable, there is no guarantee that 
removing any one source of “market failure” will move the economy towards rather than away from the 
optimum. 
25 I have compared and contrasted these theories in some detail in Lipsey 2000.  
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1834, John Rae, one of the first economists to perceive the implications of endogenous 
technological change, said: 
"Instead of pursuing a policy of non-intervention, the 'legislator' 
should stimulate foreign trade and technical progress, encourage the 
transfer of knowledge, tax luxuries, and use tariffs to protect infant 
industries." (John Rae 1834.) 
Schumpeter and other theorists of endogenous technical change have typically 
followed the direction (if not the specifics) of the policy route pointed to by Rae. 
Thus, the substantive policy issue today is not "Is technological change 
endogenous?" but "Given that it is, what is the best government policy 
response?". 
B. Advice for Developing Countries 
1. Focussed policies 
The theories in the S-E tradition suggest a need for more focused policies (it being 
always understood that these are in addition to, not substitutes for, the type of market-
orienting measures included in what John Williamson long ago called the Washington 
Consensus). In contrast to the universalism of neoclassical policy advice, S-E theories 
suggest the following:  
•  Accepting the conclusion that there is no unique optimum allocation of resources 
(because of the non-rivalrous nature of knowledge as emphasized by Romer and 
because of pervasive uncertainty surrounding technological change as emphasized 
in S-E theory) implies that there are no unique optimum rates of R&D, of 
innovation, and of diffusion. Policy with respect to these matters must, therefore, 
be based on a mixture of theory, measurement and subjective judgment. 
•  Accepting that new technological knowledge, whether acquired from abroad or 
produced by domestic R&D, has major positive externalities provides a reason to 
encourage technological advance with public funds.  
•  Accepting that technology changes endogenously provides a reason why present 
comparative advantage need not be accepted as immutable; it can be changed by 
public policy as well as by the activities of private agents. 
•  Accepting that technological change is highly dependent on local contexts implies 
that the best policies are context specific rather than being the same for all 
countries at all times.  
These ideas are both powerful and dangerous. They are powerful because they suggest 
ways to go beyond neoclassical generic policy advice to more context-specific advice. 
They are dangerous because they can easily be used to justify ignoring advice forgetting 
that the interventionist part of the S-E policy is meant to supplement the advice of the 
Washington Consensus, not to replace. 
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2. Catch up versus leading edge advance 
Developing economies are mainly concerned with technological catch up, which is a 
diffusion problem. In contrast, economies at the  cutting edge of new technologies must 
deal with issues related to novel discoveries and path breaking innovations. Although, as 
pointed out earlier, there is no sharp line between invention of new technologies and 
diffusion of existing ones, there are still differences between the problems facing an 
economy mainly concerned with technological catch-up and one concerned with cutting 
edge developments. For example, although there are some uncertainties associated with 
the local adaptations of technologies already in use elsewhere, many of the main 
uncertainties that were associated with making these cutting edge advances have already 
been resolved. What matters is that many appropriate policy requirementsfrom the 
most appropriate type of intellectual property rights, assistance to firms, education for the 
labour force, university departments and government research laboratoriesdiffer 
between economies in catch up and cutting edge situations.   
Here is one example. Many catch-up Asian countries have used consultative processes 
whereby a government agency (MITI in Japan’s case) and the main private sector agents 
came to a consensus on where the next technology push should be. The parties then 
jointly financed the required research. This policy worked well in the many catch-up 
situations for major technological advances, and it still works well when all private 
agents are pushing for a fairly well defined small-to-intermediate advance in pre-
competitive technological knowledge. Consensus and co-operation can then reduce 
wasteful duplication of research. (For further discussion see Lipsey and Carlaw 1996 and 
Lipsey and Wills 1996.) But when major breakthroughs at the cutting edge are being 
sought, the uncertainties are better coped with by a multiplicity of investigations, each 
pursued with the minimum required resources. In such cases, concentrating effort, even 
after a national consensus has been reached, has often produced poorer results than those 
produced by the apparent “wastefulness” of uncoordinated experimentation that occurs in 
the free market. 
Many confusions can arise from the failure to accept that appropriate policies vary as 
between catch-up and leading-edge situations. Here are two illustrations. First, there is a 
danger of drawing the wrong lesson when a country’s institutions that worked well at the 
catch-up stage begin to run into trouble at the cutting edge (as are many of Japan’s). 
Neoclassical economists often conclude that the policies are finally being shown to be 
bad policies in general, rather than that the policies are no longer appropriate to the new 
circumstances. Second, no country has all of its industries at the leading edge, although 
some countries may have all of their industries at the catch-up stage. More typically, 
countries have a mix of some leading edge, some catch-up, and some stagnant industries. 
This creates a serious danger of misinterpreting the evidence when policies appropriate to 
one sector fail in another. The policies may have been wrong for the sector in which they 
were applied but not wrong in other contexts. 
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3. The infant industry argument reconsidered 
Another example of how S-E theory puts new light on appropriate development policies 
concerns the infant industry argument for protecting the home market for newly 
developing industries.
26 Economists have usually sought to rationalize this argument by 
appealing to static economies of scale (thereby begging the question of why private 
finance could not be raised to allow firms to attain a size sufficient to exploit the scale 
economies implicit in existing technologies). The real significance of the infant industry 
argument turns on two aspects emphasized in S-E theory. The first is endogenous 
technological change. When technological change is endogenous, the encouragement of a 
successful infant industry, such as electronics in Taiwan, can shift the local cost curve 
downwards as new technologies are developed that produce at lower cost than anything 
previously in existence. This is not an easy thing to do, as is attested by countless failures 
to develop such industries through public policy. But neither is it impossible, as is 
attested by some major successes such as the post-second-world-war Japanese car 
industry and Taiwanese electronics. The main point is that standard text book treatments 
miss-state the infant industry problem as one of moving along a pre-existing, negatively 
sloped, long-run cost curve (based on constant technology). Whereas the real problem is 
to develop an industry whose rate of technological change (shifting cost curves 
downwards as well as developing new products) compares favorably with those of its 
foreign competitors.  
The second aspect of S-E theory that is relevant to infant industries concerns the dynamic 
path that an industry must follow as it develops through the creation and acquisition of 
both technologies and the related elements of the facilitating structure, including human 
capital. New technologies develop out of, and are placed into, the facilitating structure. 
Many of the benefits from creating new elements of that structure cannot be reaped by 
those who do the creating. There are many externalities some of which take the form of 
scale effects. For example, an isolated firm may find invention and innovation difficult. A 
growing cluster of related firms may find it much easier for several reasons. Technicians 
can trade inside knowledge (vonHipple 1988), a trained labour force will be evolving, 
and the supply of entrepreneurs will sooner or later reach some critical mass. Thus, 
creating many elements of the facilitating structure imposes net costs on the firms that 
begin a cluster and gives net benefits to firms that enter the cluster later. Infant industry 
protection, provided it is judiciously applied and sunsetted, can assist in developing a 
structure that would not arise solely from profit-motivated actions by private firms who 
create more value in the structure than they themselves can benefit from .        
                                                 
26 As a matter of fact, few countries have developed a modern industrial structure without a protective tariff 
at the early stages of their development. Many countries, including the US, went through the early stages of 
industrialization with substantial tariff protection for its infant industries. Indeed, even in the UK, the 
subsequent home of free trade, the prohibition on the importation of Indian cotton goods was an important 
incentive for the development of the machines that produced the First Industrial Revolution. 
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C. Political Structure Matters 
Another important way in which appropriate policy is context specific in both developed 
and developing economies concerns political structure. What a government is capable of 
depends on a number of things. One important influence is the basic constitution. For 
example, the US government was successfully designed by its framers to severely limit 
the power of the administration, while Parliamentary systems give much power to the 
party in power but have their own characteristic limitations. What governments are able 
to do effectively also depends on the competencies and experiences of their civil servants. 
It also depends on how easy it is for special interest groups to capture specific policies 
and turn them to their own uses. 
Thus, the public sector institutions in different countries have different institutional 
capabilities, partly based on constitutional differencese.g., US or English style 
governmentspartly on the county’s geographybecause central governments of large 
and diverse federations with strong regional governments must broker regional interests 
in ways that are not required in smaller more homogenous countriespartly on power 
relations between various special interest groups, partly on the nature of their civil service 
recruitment policies, and partly on the administration’s accumulated learning by doing in 
operating their country's typical set of policy instruments. 
This discussion of institutional capabilities shows that it is not enough to have policies 
that are well designed in the abstract. Policies must work through an institutional 
structure and their success depends to a great extent on the institutional competencies of 
those administering them. The discussion also suggests that, as long as they are 
understood to be talking about the institutional capabilities of their own public sectors, 
US economists may be right in asserting that minimal government is preferable to even 
moderately activist government, while Asian economists may also be right in asserting 
the opposite. This is yet another example of the context-specificity of good policies and 
of how misleading is the neoclassical assumption that there is one set of policies that is 
optimal for all countries at all times. 
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Caption For Figure 1: Part A shows the neoclassical approach. Inputs of labour, 
materials and the services of physical and human capital flow through the economy’s 
aggregate production function to produce economic performance, as measured by total 
national income. The form of the production function depends on the economy’s 
structure and its technology, but these things are hidden in a black box, the only 
manifestation of which is how much output emerges from a given amount of inputs.  
Part B shows our structuralist-evolutionary approach. Technological knowledge is the 
idea set for all products, process, and organizations that create economic value. The 
facilitating structure is the realization set and includes the capital goods that embody 
much of the technology, the internal organization of firms, the geographical location and 
concentration of industry, the infrastructure, and the financial system. Inputs pass through 
the structure to produce economic performance. Policy is the idea set of public objectives 
and the specification of means. The policy structure is the realization set that gives effect 
to policy, including all kinds of public institutions. Policy, working through the policy 
structure, influences the facilitating structure, technological knowledge and the 
quantity/quality of inputs. 
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